This supplementary document provides detailed theoretical analysis of a two-player ITN (insecticide-treated net) use game. In Sections 2 and 3, the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto equilibrium are dened, and the distributions of the two equilibria are shown. In Section 4, the distribution of Pareto ecient Nash equilibria is shown.
Distribution of Nash equilibria
In the ITN use game, the two players i ∈ {1, 2} have the common set of pure strategies Σ := {T, F}, and each player chooses a strategy σ i ∈ Σ. As shown in Figure 2 , the prole (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ 2 determines the players' infection probabilities, labor productivities, and expected payos.
The Nash equilibrium is the set of proles from which any player has no incentive to deviate. At the Nash equilibrium, each player's strategy is the best response against the other player's strategy. Let B i (σ 1 , σ 2 ) be the proposition that σ i is the best response against σ j , i = j, j ∈ {1, 2}. The propositions B 1 (σ 1 , σ 2 ) and B 2 (σ 1 , σ 2 ) are dened as
where U i (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ [0, ∞) denotes the expected payo of the i-th player at the prole (σ 1 , σ 2 ). Let N (σ 1 , σ 2 ) be the proposition that the prole (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium is dened as
where the operator ∧ denotes the logical conjunction of propositions.
The all-F prole (F, F) is a Nash equilibrium if
The rst and second inequalities correspond to the best responses B 1 (F, F) and B 2 (F, F), respectively. Since U 1 (F, F) = U 2 (F, F) and U 1 (T, F) = U 2 (F, T), the best responses of the two players are equivalent. Solving B 1 (F, F) with respect to P gives the interval of the all-F Nash equilibrium, that is
Note that α 1 ∈ (0, 1), α 2 ∈ (0, 1), and β ∈ (1, ∞). The all-T prole (T, T) is a Nash equilibrium if
Similar to the all-F prole, the best responses of the two players are equivalent. Solving B 1 (T, T) with respect to P gives the interval of the all-T Nash equilibrium, that is
Note that P L < P R . If α 2 < P L , P R exceeds one, and the all-T Nash equilibrium is crowded out of the domain [0, 1] . At the proles (T, F) and (F, T), the player with the strategy F free rides on the community eect provided by the player with the strategy T, without abandoning the benet from the alternative use of ITNs. For the free-rider proles,
B 1 (T, F) and B 2 (T, F) are equivalent to B 2 (F, T) and B 1 (F, T), respectively. Hence, the free-rider Nash equilibria N (T, F) and N (F, T) are equivalent. Solving N (T, F) with respect to P gives the interval of the free-rider Nash equilibria, that is
where the operator ∩ produces the intersection of sets.
Distribution of Pareto equilibria
The Pareto equilibrium is the set of proles at which any player cannot increase its payo without decreasing the other player's payo. At the Pareto equilibrium, the vector of the two players' expected payos is ecient from the viewpoint of public welfare, which means that any player's strategy is not harmful for the other player. The Pareto equilibrium is not always the Nash equilibrium, and the mismatch between the two equilibria is called a social dilemma (SD). In the social dilemma, each player's best response to the other player results in an inecient expected payo vector.
Let
Φ S (σ 1 , σ 2 ) indicates the Pareto superior region to u(σ 1 , σ 2 ). The operator × produces the Cartesian product of sets, and the operator \ produces the relative complement of the right-side set in the left-side set. By moving from u(σ 1 , σ 2 ) to u(σ 1 , σ 2 ), at least one player can increase its payo without decreasing the other player's payo. The negation of the Pareto superiority is the Pareto inferiority. The Pareto inferior region to u(σ 1 , σ 2 ), denoted by Φ I (σ 1 , σ 2 ), is expressed as Figure S1 shows the Pareto superior and inferior regions to u(σ 1 , σ 2 ). Let P(σ 1 , σ 2 ) be the proposition that the prole (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a Pareto equilibrium. The vector u(σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a Pareto equilibrium if all the other vectors are Pareto inferior to u(σ 1 , σ 2 ), that is
Since U 1 (T, F) < U 1 (T, T) and U 2 (F, T) < U 2 (T, T), the free-rider vectors u(T, F) and u(F, T) are Pareto inferior to the all-T vector u(T, T). Hence, the all-T vector is a Pareto equilibrium if the all-F vector u(F, F) is Pareto inferior to the all-T vector. Since the two players have the same payo at the all-T or all-F prole,
Solving this inequality with respect to P gives the interval of the all-T Pareto equilibrium, that is If the players move from u(σ 1 , σ 2 ) to the Pareto superior region, at least one player can increase its payo without decreasing the other player's payo. (B) Pareto inferior region to the vector u(σ 1 , σ 2 ). In the Pareto inferior region, at least one player's payo decreases compared to u(σ 1 , σ 2 ).
Since U 2 (F, F) < U 2 (T, F) and U 1 (F, F) < U 1 (F, T), the all-F vector is Pareto inferior to the free-rider vectors. The free-rider vectors are Pareto inferior to each other due to the symmetry as follows:
If a player increases its payo by moving from one free-rider prole to another, the other player's payo decreases. The free-rider vectors are Pareto equilibria if the all-T vector is Pareto inferior to the free-rider vectors. Since
The two inequalities are equivalent, and hence the interval of the free-rider Pareto equilibria is
The all-T vector is Pareto inferior to the all-F vector if U i (T, T) ≤ U i (F, F). When this inequality holds, the free-rider vectors are also Pareto inferior to the all-F vector because U 1 (T, F) < U 1 (T, T) and U 2 (F, T) < U 2 (T, T). Hence, the interval of the all-F Pareto equilibrium is
Figure S2: Distribution of Pareto ecient Nash equilibria (PNE) in the ITN use game. At the PNE, the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto equilibrium hold simultaneously. If P lies in the gap between P * L and P L , the players are attracted to the all-F social dilemma (SD) at which the all-F prole is a Nash equilibrium but is not a Pareto equilibrium.
Distribution of Pareto ecient Nash equilibria
The Pareto ecient Nash equilibrium (PNE) is the set of proles at which the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto equilibrium are achieved simultaneously. At the PNE, each player's best response to the other player is also desirable for the public welfare, that is, for the expected payo vector. For each prole, the interval of the PNE is obtained by taking the intersection of the intervals of the two equilibria. Let S(σ 1 , σ 2 ) be the proposition that the prole (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a PNE. The PNE is dened as
The intervals of the all-T, free-rider, and all-F PNE are written as follows:
The all-T Nash equilibrium is Pareto ecient everywhere. The free-rider Nash equilibria are also Pareto ecient almost everywhere. The all-F Nash equilibrium is Pareto ecient except for the interval (P * L , P L ]. This gap is covered by the all-F SD dened as N (F, F) ∧ ¬P(F, F), where the operator ¬ denotes the negation of a proposition. Figure S2 shows the distribution of PNE in the ITN use game. If P R ≤ 1, the domain [0, 1] is covered by the four solutions: the all-F, free-rider, all-T PNE, and the all-F SD. If P R > 1, the all-T PNE is crowded out of the domain [0, 1] . The union of the all-F PNE and the all-F SD is equivalent to the all-F Nash equilibrium. Figure 3 in the main manuscript illustrates the PNE for dierent parameter combinations.
